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Abstract
We analyze the revenue loss due to market shrinkage. Specifically, consider a simple market
with one item for sale and n bidders whose values are drawn from some joint distribution.
Suppose that the market shrinks as a single bidder retires from the market. Suppose furthermore
that the value of this retiring bidder is fixed and always strictly smaller than the values of the
other bidders. We show that even this slight decrease in competition might cause a significant
fall of a multiplicative factor of 1
e+1
≈ 0.268 in the revenue that can be obtained by a dominant
strategy ex-post individually rational mechanism.
In particular, our results imply a solution to an open question that was posed by Dobzinski,
Fu, and Kleinberg [STOC’11].
”Take heed of the children of the poor, for from them will Torah come forth.”
— Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 81a.
1 Introduction
How much revenue might a firm lose due to market shrinkage? We study this question in a simple
market with n bidders and one item. The private values of the bidders (v1, . . . , vn) are drawn from
some known distribution. Now suppose that one bidder retires from the market. Our goal is to
compare the maximum revenue that can be extracted in the original market by a dominant-strategy
mechanism that is also ex-post individually rational to the maximum revenue that can be obtained
by a similar mechanism in the smaller market.
Obviously, if the value of the retiring bidder is always much larger than the values of the rest of
the bidders then almost all revenue will be lost. Thus, we consider an extreme situation where the
retiring bidder is the weakest competitor in the market: in every realization (v1, . . . , vn) the value of
the retiring bidder vi is always strictly smaller than the value of any other bidder vj . Furthermore,
we will assume that vi is identical in all realizations, so the value of the retiring bidder vi conveys
no information at all about the values of other bidders.
One might speculate that as the number of bidders increases the relative contribution to the
revenue of payments by this retiring bidder diminishes. However, we show that – perhaps counter-
intuitively – even this slight decrease in competition, i.e., the same large market but with the absence
of its least valuable consumer, might cause the revenue to fall by a constant multiplicative factor,
independently of the size of the market:
Theorem (informal): For any n, there exists a joint distribution Hn over the values of n bidders
with the following properties:
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• Bidder n is a “weak” bidder (as discussed above).
• The maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by a dominant strategy ex-post indi-
vidually rational mechanism in a market with n bidders whose values are distributed according
to Hn is at least 1.
• Let Hn−1 be the joint distribution over n − 1 values that is obtained from Hn by removing
the value of bidder n. The maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by a dominant
strategy ex-post individually rational mechanism in a market with n− 1 bidders whose values
are distributed according to Hn−1 is at most ee+1 ≈ 0.731.
A dual interpretation of our result is that in some markets firms should consider investing effort in
market expansion, as even recruiting a single low value consumer might lead to a revenue surge.
Obviously there are markets in which recruiting low value consumers does not lead to a significant
increase in the revenue – understanding whether there are practical distributions in which recruiting
low value consumers leads to a significant increase in the revenue is an interesting open question.
As we will discuss later, the e
e+1 ratio is essentially tight, by a result of [3]. Interestingly, we
cannot hope to obtain a similar result with independent valuations: when the values are distributed
independently and identically, it is easy to see (directly or by applying market-expansion theorems
like Bulow-Klemperer [1]) that a removal of any single bidder decreases the revenue by a factor of
at most 1
n
, where n is the number of bidders in the market. A more careful argument gives that
this factor continues to hold when removing the weakest bidder from a market in which the values
are distributed independently but not necessarily identically [9].
We note that our theorem holds regardless of whether we compare the best randomized truthful
in expectation mechanisms in both markets or the best deterministic mechanisms.
Connection to Previous Work
Our result is directly connected to the literature on approximating revenue maximizing auctions
when the values of the bidders are correlated. This line of research was initiated by Ronen [9].
In particular, Ronen introduces the Lookahead auction: this is the dominant strategy, ex-post
individually rational revenue maximizing auction among all auctions that are only allowed to sell to
the bidder with the highest value. Ronen shows that the Lookahead auction extracts in expectation
at least half of the expected revenue of the unconstrained dominant-strategy individually rational
revenue maximizing mechanism1.
The k-lookahead auction is a natural generalization: this is the dominant strategy, ex-post
individually rational revenue maximizing auction among all auctions that are only allowed to sell
the item to one of the k bidders with the highest values. Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg [5] show
that the k-lookahead extracts a fraction of at least 2k−13k−1 of the revenue of the unconstrained revenue
maximizing mechanism. The analysis was improved by [3] where it was shown that the fraction is
at least e
1− 1
k
e
1− 1
k +1
and that this is tight for k = 2.
However, a question that was left open in [5, 3] is to determine whether the expected revenue
of the k-lookahead auction approaches 1 as k < n increases2. Our result answers this question and
shows that it does not since in the presence of a weak bidder the revenue of the k-lookahead auction
1Cremer and Mclean [4] show that under certain assumptions on the distribution there is a dominant-strategy
mechanism that extracts all the surplus of the bidders. However, their mechanism is only ex-interim individually
rational, whereas our interest here is in ex-post individually rational mechanisms.
2Previously, for k > 2 the best result was that for every k there is a distribution for which the k-lookahead auction
does not extract more than k
k+2
of the revenue [3], improving over the k
k+1
factor obtained by [5].
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on the original market is actually identical to the revenue of the revenue-maximizing mechanism
on the smaller market. Furthermore, our result is asymptotically tight since the revenue of the
k-lookahead auction is at least e
1− 1
k
e
1− 1
k +1
of the revenue of the optimal auction [3], and this expression
approaches e
e+1 as k grows. Note that there is a gap between the bounds for any constant k ≥ 3,
closing it remains an interesting open question.
Our result also has some implications on the computational complexity of approximating revenue
maximizing auctions [5, 8, 2, 3]. Specifically, we show that the analysis of the best currently known
polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism cannot be improved.
We now elaborate on this point. It is known that determining the revenue of the revenue-
maximizing deterministic auction for three bidders or more is NP hard within some constant factor
[8, 2]. In contrast, a revenue maximizing truthful in expectation mechanism can be computed in
polynomial time for any fixed number of bidders [5]. Thus, for every constant k the k-lookahead
auction can be implemented in polynomial time. Combining with the bound of [3], we get that
there is a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that extracts in expectation an e
e+1
fraction of the revenue of the optimal truthful in expectation mechanism. This is the best bound
known for truthful in expectation mechanisms. As we discussed, it was not known whether the
analysis of the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is tight or not. Our result implies
that we cannot hope to improve the bound by improving the analysis of the k-lookahead auction.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a single item auction setting with n bidders. Each bidder i has a (privately known) value
vi for the item. The values are drawn from some joint distribution D. A (direct) mechanism M takes
a profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) and returns an allocation probability and a non-negative expected price
for each bidder. We use M (v) =
((
x
M(v)
1 , p
M(v)
1
)
, . . . ,
(
x
M(v)
n , p
M(v)
n
))
to denote the outcome.
Thus, given v, M allocates to bidder i with probability x
M(v)
i and bidder i pays
p
M(v)
i
x
M(v)
i
if allocated.
A mechanism M is ex-post individually rational (IR) if for all v and i: x
M(v)
i · vi ≥ p
M(v)
i .
A mechanism M is truthful in expectation if for every vi, v
′
i and v−i: x
M(vi,v−i)
i · vi− p
M(vi,v−i)
i ≥
x
M(v′i,v−i)
i · vi − p
M(v′i,v−i)
i . Notice that truthfulness should hold also for profiles that are not in
the support of D. The expected revenue of M over D is
∑
v∈D PrD [v]
(∑n
i=1 p
M(v)
i
)
. A truthful in
expectation mechanismM is optimal if the revenue ofM is at least that of any other mechanismM ′.
We let rev(D) denote the supremum of the revenue3 that can be extracted by a truthful mechanism
when the values are distributed according to D and revD(M) the revenue of a specific mechanism
M . We will sometimes omit the subscript D when D is known from the context.
A mechanism M is monotone if for every i, vi, v
′
i, v−i s.t. vi < v
′
i we have that x
M(vi,v−i)
i ≤
x
M(v′i,v−i)
i . It is well known that a mechanism can be implemented truthfully if and only if it is
monotone. The following proposition gives the payments:
Proposition 2.1 ([7]). A mechanism M is truthful in expectation if and only if
p
M(v)
i =
∫ vi
0
z ·
d
dz
x
M(z,v−i)
i dz
3The support of the distribution that we consider are infinite, so possibly no mechanism attains this supremum.
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3 A Market with a Revenue Loss of 1e+1
Let Hn be a distribution over the values of n bidders. We say that bidder i is a weak bidder in Hn
if vi is the same in every profile (v1, . . . , vn) in the support of Hn and furthermore we have that
vi < vi′ for all i 6= i
′. Hn contains a weak bidder if there is some bidder that is weak in Hn. Without
loss of generality, we will assume that the weak bidder is bidder n. Given a distribution Hn which
contains a weak bidder, let Hn−1 be the distribution of Hn after shrinkage: a distribution over the
values of bidders 1, ..., n − 1 which is obtained by sampling from Hn and ignoring the value of the
weak bidder n. Our main result analyzes the revenue loss due to the shrinkage:
Theorem 3.1. For every n ≥ 3 and δ > 0, there exist a distribution Hn that contains a weak bidder
and a distribution Hn−1 of Hn after shrinkage such that
rev(Hn−1)
rev(Hn) <
e
e+1 + δ.
As noted in the introduction, this ratio (≈ 0.731) is asymptotically tight [3]. For n = 2 the right
ratio is 12 [9] and for n = 3 the right ratio is
√
e
1+
√
e
[3].
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 3.1 and we start by giving some intuition
on the proof. We will construct Hn, a distribution over the values of n bidders with the following
properties:
• The value of bidder 1 will be selected from a family of equal revenue distributions, each with
an expected revenue of e
e−1 .
• We will always have v2, . . . , vn−1 ≈ 1 in the support ofHn−1. The precise values of v2, . . . , vn−1
will jointly encode a parameter h that will determine the specific distribution of v1.
• The value of bidder n is always fixed to 1.
We will see that to maximize revenue one has to determine the parameter h by observing
v2, . . . , vn−1, and offer bidder 1 to purchase the item at a price that is a function of h. If bidder 1
declines to purchase the item at the requested price, we obviously want to sell the item to one of the
bidders 2, . . . , n at the highest price possible, which is approximately 1 (since the values of bidders
2, . . . , n is approximately 1). However, we will not be able to sell the item to bidders 2, . . . , n − 1.
The intuitive reason is that we’ve used their values in order to determine h. However, we may sell
to bidder n since we have not used vn to determine the price for bidder 1. Thus, the revenue is
maximized in a mechanism that determines the take-it-or-leave-it offer to bidder 1 by querying the
values of v2, . . . , vn−1, and if bidder 1 rejects the offer the item is sold to bidder n for price 1.
The point is that bidder n is a weak bidder in Hn. In particular, to maximize revenue in the
distribution Hn−1 (that is obtained from Hn by removing bidder n), one still has to determine
h by querying v2, . . . , vn−1 and set accordingly a take-it-or-leave-it offer to bidder 1. However,
if bidder 1 rejects the offer we cannot sell the item at all. The gap in the revenue between the
optimal mechanisms before and after the shrinkage is therefore exactly the probability that optimal
mechanisms for Hn sell the item to bidder n. Equivalently, this is the probability that the item is
not sold at all in an optimal mechanism for the distribution Hn−1.
3.1 The Distribution over n Bidders
We start with defining the distribution over the values of n bidders Hn. The next definition will
be used to determine the specific values of v2, . . . , vn−1 which in turn will be used to determine the
value of the parameter h.
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Definition 3.2. Let Xdǫ be a random variable with support over the positive integers. Let 1 > ǫ > 0.
Xdǫ is (ǫ, d) − balanced if for every integer i ≥ 1 s.t. i mod d = 1:
1. Pr
[
Xdǫ = i
]
= Pr
[
Xdǫ = i+ 1
]
= · · · = Pr
[
Xdǫ = i+ (d− 1)
]
.
2. (1− ǫ) Pr
[
Xdǫ = i
]
= Pr
[
Xdǫ = i+ d
]
.
Note that if Xdǫ is (ǫ, d)-balanced then for all ℓ ≥ 1 and j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, Pr
[
Xdǫ = ℓ
]
≥
Pr
[
Xdǫ = ℓ+ j
]
≥ (1− ǫ) Pr
[
Xdǫ = ℓ
]
. When ǫ is known from the context we sometimes refer to
(ǫ, d)-balanced random variables as d-balanced. Appendix A.1 shows the existence of (ǫ, d)-balanced
distributions.
Define Hn, a distribution (with parameters d,ǫ) over the values of n bidders: let z =
e
e−1 ,
m =
⌊
d
z
− 1
⌋
. Let D0, . . . ,Dm−1 be m distributions over R that will be defined in Subsection 3.1.1:
• vn is always fixed to 1− 2ǫ.
• For every 2 ≤ i < n, let vi = 1 − 2ǫ + ǫ · Σ
Xi
j=1
1
2j
where Xi is an independent (ǫ, d)-balanced
variable.
• Let h(v−1) = min
(∑n−1
j=2 Xi mod d,m− 1
)
. v1 is distributed Dh(v−1).
3.1.1 The Distributions D0, . . . ,Dm−1
We now describe the distributions D0, . . . ,Dm−1. All are equal revenue distributions. The descrip-
tion is technical and might require some time to digest. However, we do note that for the analysis
we will mostly refer to the simple properties that are stated in Lemma 3.3.
Define the probabilities q0, . . . , qm−2 ∈ R and q0, . . . qm−1 ∈ R:
• For every y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}: qy =
(z−1)d
(d−y)(d−y−1) .
• For every y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}: qy = 1−
∑y−1
j=0 qj.
Define the values t0, t1, . . . , tm−1 ∈ R: ty = z(1−∑y−1j=0 qj) =
z
qy
. Note that z = t0 < t1 < · · · < tm−1.
We now define D0, . . . ,Dm−1. First, D0(x) = t0 = z with probability 1. For every 1 ≤ y ≤ m− 1:
Dy (x) =


t0 w.p. q0
t1 w.p. q1
...
...
ty−1 w.p. qy−1
ty w.p. qy
Notice that the support of each distribution Di+1 contains the support of Di and one additional
value. Moreover, all distributions are equal revenue distributions (see Lemma 3.3). We note that:
• For every y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} and every j ∈ {y, . . . ,m− 1}: qy = Pr [v1 = ty|h (v−1) = y] =
Pr [v1 ≥ ty|h (v−1) = j].
• For every y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}: qy = Pr [v1 = ty|y < h (v−1) ≤ m− 1].
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Proof. We prove only the first claim, the second part is immediate from the definitions. For the first
bullet point, let y ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} and let m−1 ≥ j ≥ l. Consider Dy and Dj . The probability that
bidder 1’s value is lower than ty if his value is distributed Dy or Dj is
∑j−1
k=0 qk, as his probability
for every value tk is qk for every k ∈ {0, . . . , y − 1}. Thus the probability of his valuation being
higher is 1−
∑j−1
k=0 qk. For Dy, the only higher value possible is ty.
Next we prove some simple and useful facts related to D0, . . . ,Dm−1.
Lemma 3.3. For d ≥ 4 the following holds:
1. For all y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, qy · ty = z (i.e., D0, . . . ,Dm−1 are equal revenue distributions).
2. For all y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}, qy+1 + qy = qy.
3. For all y ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} ,
∑y−1
j=0 qj =
(z−1)
(d−y)y.
4. For all y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, qy =
d−z·y
d−y .
5. For all y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}, qy + (d− y − 1) qy = z = qy · ty.
Proof.
1. qy · ty = qy ·
z
qy
= z.
2. qy+1 + qy =
(
1−
∑y
j=0 qy + qy
)
=
(
1−
∑y−1
j=0 qy
)
= qy.
3.
∑y−1
j=0 qj =
∑y−1
j=0
(z−1)d
(d−j)(d−j−1) = (z − 1) d ·
∑y−1
j=0
1
(d−j)(d−j−1) = (z − 1) d ·
∑d
r=d−(y−1)
1
r(r−1) =
(z − 1) d ·
∑d
r=d−(y−1)
(
1
r−1 −
1
r
)
= (z − 1) · d ·
(
1
d−y −
1
d
)
= (z − 1) · d · y
d(d−y) =
(z−1)
(d−y) · y.
4. If y = 0 then qy = 1 =
d−z·0
d−0 . If y > 0 then, using property 3, qy =
(
1−
∑y−1
j=0 qj
)
=
1− (z−1)
d−y · y =
d−z·y
d−y .
5. qy + (d− y − 1) qy =
d−z·y
(d−y) + (d− y − 1)
(z−1)d
(d−y)(d−y−1) =
d−z·y+z·d−d
(d−y) =
z·(d−y)
(d−y) = z.
Claim 3.4. D0, . . . ,Dm−1 are valid distributions.
Proof. D0 is valid, as it is a probability distribution over one value with probability 1. For Dj where
1 ≤ j ≤ m−1, we need to show that 1 > qj > 0, 1 > qj > 0,
∑j−1
i=0 qi < 1 and that
∑j−1
i=0 qi+qj = 1.
By definition
∑j−1
i=0 qi+ qj =
∑j−1
i=0 qi+
(
1−
∑j−1
i=0 qi
)
= 1. We will show that
∑j−1
i=0 qi < 1 and the
rest follows, as qi = 1−
∑i−1
j=0 qj and qi are positive. Using property 3:
j−1∑
i=0
qi ≤
(z − 1)
(d− (m− 1))
(m− 1)
m=⌊ dz ⌋−1
= (z − 1)
⌊
d
z
− 1
⌋
d−
⌊
d
z
⌋
+ 2
< (z − 1)
d
z
d−
⌊
d
z
⌋ = d− dz
d−
⌊
d
z
⌋ ≤ 1
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3.2 Outline of the Proof of Theorem 3.1
We will now derive the main result by applying a few lemmas. The proof of Lemma 3.6 is in
Subsection 3.3 and the proof of Lemma 3.7 can be found in Subsection 3.4.
We first want to claim that to maximize revenue we should not sell the item to bidders 2, . . . , n−1.
We will do so in two steps. In Lemma 3.6 we claim that we can focus on high priced mechanisms
(a technical notion that we will shortly define). Claim 3.7 shows that high priced mechanisms
maximize the revenue by not selling to bidders 2, . . . , n − 1.
Definition 3.5. A mechanism for n − 1 bidders is high priced if in every profile v ∈ Hn−1 where
bidder 1 is allocated with positive probability it holds that v1 ≥ th(v−1).
The next lemma shows that we can alter any mechanism to be high priced without changing the
revenue (with respect to Hn−1). The heart of this transformation is based on the observation that
by the construction of Hn−1 given the values of bidders 2, . . . , n− 1, bidder 1’s value is drawn from
an equal revenue distribution. We use this observation as follows (for simplicity we assume in this
paragraph that the mechanism is deterministic): if, given v2, . . . , vn−1, bidder 1 is offered to buy
the item at price p < th(v−1), set the price in these instances to p = th(v−1). Note that the expected
revenue remains the same because of the equal revenue distribution and since the allocation function
to bidders 2, . . . , n−1 is unchanged. Feasibility is not violated by the transformation, since in every
instance in which bidder 1 purchases the item after the transformation he also purchases the item
in the original mechanism, before the transformation. Finally, notice that given v−1 the possible
values of bidder 1 in the support of Hn−1 are at most th(v−1), so the item will never be sold if
p > th(v−1).
Lemma 3.6. LetMn−1 be a mechanism for n−1 bidders. Then, there exists a high priced mechanism
M ′n−1 such that revHn−1(M
′
n−1) ≥ revHn−1(Mn−1).
Lemma 3.7. Let Mn−1 be a high priced mechanism for n − 1 bidders. Then, there exists a high
priced mechanism M ′n−1 such that for every i = 2, . . . , n−1 and v ∈ Hn−1 we have that x
Mn−1(v)
i = 0
(i.e., bidders 2, . . . , n − 1 are never allocated) and with revHn−1(M ′n−1) ≥ revHn−1(Mn−1).
The two lemmas give us that the revenue of every mechanism for Hn−1 is dominated by a
mechanism that only allocates to bidder 1. This allows us to bound the revenue that can be
obtained by any mechanism:
Corollary 3.8. Let Mn−1 be a mechanism for n− 1 bidders. Then, revHn−1(Mn−1) ≤
e
e−1 .
Proof. By Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, there exists a mechanism M ′n−1 such that the revenue of Mn−1 is at
most the revenue of M ′n−1, and M
′
n−1 only allocates to bidder 1. Now, for every realization of v−1,
bidder 1’s value is distributed according to an equal revenue distribution with revenue e
e−1 . Thus,
revHn−1 (Mn−1) ≤ revHn−1
(
M ′n−1
)
≤ e
e−1 .
The next lemma shows a simple connection between the revenue of mechanisms for Hn−1 and
mechanisms for Hn:
Lemma 3.9. Let Mn−1 be a mechanism for n − 1 bidders. There exists a mechanism Mn for n
bidders such that: revHn (Mn) ≥ revHn−1(Mn−1) + Prv∼Hn
[
v1 6= th(v−1)
]
· (1− 2ǫ).
Proof. Given Mn−1, let M ′n−1 be the high priced mechanism that allocates the item only to bidder
1 and has at least the same revenue of Mn−1, as guaranteed by Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7.
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Consider the following mechanism Mn: if v1 ≥ th(v−1) then allocate to bidder 1 with probability
x
M ′n−1
1 (v) and charge x
M ′n−1
1 (v) · th(v−1). Otherwise, allocate to bidder n and charge 1 − 2ǫ (if
vn ≥ 1 − 2ǫ, else do not allocate the item at all). The mechanism is clearly truthful and ex-
post IR. The revenue is revHn−1
(
M ′n−1
)
+ Prv∼Hn
[
v1 6= th(v−1)
]
· (1− 2ǫ) ≥ revHn−1 (Mn−1) +
Prv∼Hn
[
v1 6= th(v−1)
]
· (1− 2ǫ).
Corollary 3.10. rev(Hn−1)
rev(Hn) ≤
e
e−1
e
e−1
+ 1
e−1
(∑d
j=d−⌊ dz ⌋+1
1
j
)
(1−2ǫ)
.
Proof. By Corollary 3.8, Lemma 3.9 and a simple calculation of Prv∼Hn
[
v1 6= th(v−1)
]
:
Pr
v∼Hn
[
v1 6= th(v−1)
]
=
m−2∑
j=0
Pr [v1 = tj ∧ h (v−1) 6= j] =
m−2∑
j=0
Pr [v1 = tj |h (v−1) > j] · Pr [h (v−1) > j]
=
m−2∑
j=0
Pr [v1 = tj|h (v−1) > j] · (1− Pr [h (v−1) ≤ j])
=
m−2∑
j=0
=qj=
d·(z−1)
(d−j−1)(d−j)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr [v1 = tj|h (v−1) > j] ·
d−j−1
d︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1−
j + 1
d
)
=(z − 1)
m−2∑
j=0
1
(d− j)
=
m=⌊ dz−1⌋
= (z − 1)
d∑
j=d−⌊dz ⌋+1
1
j
We can now finish the proof of Theorem 3.1. Applying Lemma A.2 (in the appendix), we have
that limd→∞,ǫ→0
rev(Hn−1)
rev(Hn) ≤
e
e−1
e
e−1
+( ee−1−1)
= e2e−(e−1) =
e
e+1 . Thus, by Corollary 3.10, for every
δ > 0 there exist d ≥ 4 and ǫ > 0 such that rev(Hn−1)
rev(Hn) <
e
e+1 + δ.
3.3 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Consider a mechanismMn−1, and letM ′n−1 be the following high priced mechanism for n−1 bidders.
The allocation and payments of bidders 2, . . . , n − 1 remain the same as in Mn−1. The allocation
and payment of bidder 1 are defined as follows:

(
x
Mn−1
(
th(v
−1)
,v−1
)
1 , th(v−1) · x
Mn−1
(
th(v
−1)
,v−1
)
1
)
v1 ≥ th(v−1);
(0, 0) otherwise.
Claim 3.11. M ′n−1 always outputs a feasible allocation and is truthful in expectation.
Proof. Notice that for every v the allocation is valid since bidders 2, . . . , n−1 are allocated identically
and the allocation probability of bidder 1 does not increase: when v1 < th(v−1) then bidder 1 is not
allocated at all in M ′n−1. When v1 = th(v−1) then the allocation is identical. When v1 > th(v−1) the
allocation probability of bidder 1 in Mn−1 is by monotonicity at least x
Mn−1
1
(
th(v−1), v−1
)
. This
last expression is the allocation probability of bidder 1 in M ′n−1.
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As for truthfulness, clearly, for bidders 2, . . . , n − 1 the mechanism is truthful in expectation,
as we have not changed their allocation probabilities or payments. As for bidder 1, his allocation
function is clearly monotone and the payments are according to Proposition 2.1. Hence M ′n−1 is
truthful in expectation.
It is left is to show that rev
(
M ′n−1
)
≥ rev (Mn−1). The payments of bidders 2, . . . , n − 1 are
identical in both mechanisms, thus it remains to show that the expected payment of bidder 1 has
not decreased. We show that for every fixed v−1. Let h(v−1) = y and x1 = x
Mn−1(ty ,v−1)
1 . When
the values of all other bidders are v−1, bidder 1’s expected payment is Pr[v1 = ty|v−1] · ty · x1 =
qy · ty · x1 = z · x1.
Since the allocation function of Mn−1 is monotone, for every v′1 ≤ v1, Mn−1 allocates to bidder
1 with probability at most x1. We now bound from above the revenue of the optimal revenue of
a mechanism M ′′ for a single bidder that is distributed Dy and never allocates with probability
larger than x1. We will show that the revenue of M
′′ is at most z · x1, which will imply that
rev(M ′n−1) ≥ rev(Mn−1). To see this, recall that by [6, 5], any truthful in expectation mechanism
for a single bidder can be implemented as a universally truthful mechanism: a distribution over
deterministic mechanisms. Now, for a single bidder a deterministic mechanism is simply a take-it-
or-leave-it price. Since Dy is an equal revenue distribution with revenue z, and since the maximum
allocation is x1, the revenue of Mn−1 is at most z · x1, as needed.
3.4 Proof of Lemma 3.7
The proof plan is to take the high priced mechanism Mn−1 and look for profiles in the support of
Hn−1 in which some bidder i > 1 is allocated with positive probability. We will obtain M ′n−1 by
“fixing” those profiles, essentially by shifting the allocation probability of bidder i to bidder 1 and
then showing that the shifting has not decreased the revenue.
We will transform Mn−1 to M ′n−1 in steps: we will find a “minimal” profile v
′ (in a sense that
will be formally defined) in which the allocation probability of some bidder i > 1 is positive. We
will “fix” this profile as well as some “neighboring” profiles and continue. Notice that in principle
there might be an infinite number of profiles that require a fix. Fortunately, the support of Hn−1 is
countable so the process is guaranteed to eventually reach every specific profile.
Now for the formal description. We first apply a “pre processing step”: consider some profile v
which is not in the support of Hn−1. Suppose that there is some bidder i with a non-zero allocation
probability. We set the allocation probability of this bidder i to 0 if for each v′i < vi it holds
that v′ = (v′i, v−i) is not in Hn−1 or the allocation probability of bidder i is 0. Note that this
preprocessing does not affect monotonicity and that the revenue does not decrease.
We say that a profile v in the support of Hn−1 is problematic if for some i > 1, x
Mn−1(v)
i > 0
and v1 = th(v−1).
We first claim that if there is some v in the support of Hn−1 and some bidder i > 1 with
x
Mn−1(v)
i > 0, then there exists a problematic profile. To see this, let v
1 be the minimal profile
(v1, . . . , vi−1, s, vi+1, . . . , vn) which is in the support of Hn−1 that is strictly bigger coordinate-wise
than v, let v2 be the minimal profile (v1, . . . , vi−1, s′, vi+1, . . . , vn) ∈ Hn−1 which is strictly bigger
than v1 and so on (notice that the instances v, v1, v2, . . . differ only in bidder i’s value). Since bidder
i’s allocation probability is positive in v′, by monotonicity the allocation probability of bidder i is
also positive in vk, for every k ≥ 1. Now observe that for some profile j, 1 ≤ j ≤ d it holds that
vj1 = th(vj
−1)
thus vj is problematic.
If there are no problematic profiles we are already done. If there are several such profiles, let v′
be a problematic profile such that there is no problematic profile v′′ 6= v′ with v′′i′ ≤ v
′
i′ for every
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i′ > 1. Note that the existence of one problematic profile v′ implies the existence of a “minimal”
problematic profile since the number of profiles in the support of Hn−1 that are dominated by v′
coordinate-wise is finite. Let I be the set of bidders (excluding bidder 1) with a positive allocation
probability in v′ and let y = h(v′−1).
We now “fix” the mechanism Mn−1 by defining a high priced mechanism M ′ with higher revenue.
The behavior of M ′ and Mn−1 will differ only in the profile v′ and “neighboring” profiles. We then
continue fixing the other problematic profiles: we take M ′ and fix the next problematic profile by
obtaining M ′′, then fix the next problematic profile in M ′′, and so on.
Let M ′ be the mechanism with the following allocation function: the allocations of all bidders
that are not in I ∪ {1} remain the same. We set the allocation probability of every bidder i ∈ I in
v′ to 0. By monotonicity, we have to set the allocation probability of bidder i ∈ I in each of the
profiles in the set Gi = {v|v−i = v′−i and vi ≤ v
′
i} to 0.
In addition, we shift the allocation probability mass in v′ from each bidder i ∈ I to bidder 1:
x
M ′(v′)
1 = x
Mn−1(v′)
1 +Σi∈Ix
Mn−1(v′)
i . To guarantee monotonicity, we set the allocation probability of
bidder 1 to x
M ′(v′)
1 , and the probability of bidders 2, . . . , n−1 to 0 in every profile in G1 = {v|v−1 =
v′−1 and v1 > v
′
1}. Notice that profiles in G1 are not in the support of Hn−1 since v
′
1 = th(v′
−1)
. The
payment of bidder 1 in the profiles {v′} ∪G1 is ty ·
(
x
Mn−1(v′)
1 +Σi∈Ix
Mn−1(v′)
i
)
. The allocation in
profiles that are not in G1 ∪ (∪i∈IGi) is identical to the allocation of the mechanism Mn−1.
Claim 3.12. For every bidder i, the allocation of M ′ is feasible and monotone. In addition, M’ is
high priced.
Proof. We will first show that in every profile the total allocation probability of M ′ is at most that
of Mn−1. The allocation in every valuation profile that is not in G1 ∪ (∪i∈IGi) is identical to that
of Mn−1, hence feasible. In v′ and in profiles in G1, the total allocation probability in M ′ is the
total allocation probability of Mn−1 in the profile v′, which by feasibility of Mn−1 is at most 1.
As for monotonicity, given a minimal problematic vector v′ as above, M ′ is monotone for all
bidders except bidder 1 and bidders in I, as their allocations remain the same. Bidder 1’s allocation
function is monotone since we have just changed the profile v′ and profiles in G1: monotonicity
requires that the allocation probability of bidder 1 in each profile v ∈ G1 will be at least his
allocation probability in v′, and in M ′ these two probabilities are equal. Similarly, the allocation of
bidder i ∈ I has changed only for v′ and profiles in Gi: bidder i’s allocation probability in v′ is 0
and this probability remains 0 when vi decreases in any other profile v ∈ Gi.
To finish the monotonicity proof, suppose that for some bidder i and v ∈ G1 which was altered
due to a minimal problematic vector v′ the mechanism is not monotone (observe that v−1 = v′−1).
That is, there exists a profile v′′ where v−i = v′−i but vi > v
′′
i , and bidder i’s allocation in v
′′
i is
greater than bidder i’s allocation in v′i. If v
′′ is in the support of Hn−1 then we reach a contradiction
since v′ is not a minimal vector (v′′ is “smaller” – notice that minimality is only defined with respect
to bidders 2, . . . , n− 1). If v′′ is not in the support, then by our “preprocessing” there must be some
u = (ui, v
′′
−i) ∈ Hn−1 with ui < v
′′
i in which the allocation probability of bidder i is not 0. But
similarly to before this u is in contradiction to the minimality of v′.
Finally, in every allocation v ∈ Gi (i > 1) the allocation is identical to that of Mn−1, except
that the allocation probability of bidder i is 0. It is also not hard to see that if Mn−1 is high priced
then M ′ is high priced as well.
The claim guarantees that the allocation function is monotone, hence there are payments that
make it truthful in expectation. The next claim analyzes these payments:
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Claim 3.13. For every profile v 6= v′, v ∈ Hn−1: p
Mn−1(v)
1 = p
M ′(v)
1 . For the profile v
′, pM
′(v)
1 =
p
Mn−1(v′)
1 + ty · Σi∈Ix
Mn−1(v′)
i . For every bidder i > 1 and profile v /∈ {v
′} ∪Gi, p
Mn−1(v)
i ≤ p
M ′(v)
i .
Proof. The claim regarding the payments of bidder 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.1. As
for the payments of bidder i > 1, recall that by Proposition 2.1, for any mechanism M it holds that
p
M(v)
i =
∫ vi
0 z ·
d
dz
x
M(z,v−i)
i dz. That is, when drawing the allocation probability as a function of the
value, the payment is the area between the allocation curve and the y-axis. Reducing the allocation
probability at some points clearly increases the payments.
We show that rev (M ′) > rev (Mn−1) by proving that even though M ′ extracts less revenue from
bidders in I in v′ and profiles in ∪i∈IGi it compensates by extracting more revenue from bidder 1
in v′.
Towards this end, consider some bidder i ∈ I and denote s0 = v′i. Fixing v
′
−i, let s
−1 denote
the highest value that bidder i gets in v ∈ Hn−1 subject to the constraints that v−i = v′−i and
vi < v
′
i. Define s
−j similarly but with respect to the j’th highest value that bidder i gets. Note
that h(v2, . . . , vi−1, s−d, vi+1, . . . , vn−1) = y and that in the valuation profile (s−d, v′−i) bidder i’s
allocation probability is 0, otherwise we get a contradiction to the minimality of v′.
M ′ extracts more revenue than Mn−1 from bidder 1 in the valuation profile (s0, v′−i) due to the
shifted mass from bidder i to bidder 1. By our discussion above, M ′ potentially extracts less revenue
than Mn−1 precisely in the valuation profiles (s−j , v′−i), for j = 1, . . . , d − 1 where the allocation
probability of bidder i has possibly decreased. We conservatively assume the in profiles that are not
in {v′} ∪Gi the payments of bidder i in M ′ and Mn−1 are the same (by Claim 3.13 they might be
higher in M ′). In fact, it is enough to focus on instances (s−j, v′−i) for j ≥ d− y+1 since otherwise
the probability (given the values of the other bidders) that v1 = ty is 0.
We will show that x
Mn−1(v′)
i · (Pr [v
′] (ty − v′i)) > x
Mn−1(v′)
i ·
∑d−1
j=d−y+1 Pr
[(
s−j, v′−i
)]
· v′i (i.e.,
the additional revenue due to the mass shifted from bidder i to bidder 1 is higher than the revenue
loss due to not allocating to bidder i in {v′} ∪Gi). Notice that by individual rationality we use the
value of bidder i as an upper bound to his payment, and by monotonicity we have that x
Mn−1(v′)
i is
an upper bound to the allocation probability of Mn−1 to bidder i in every profile in Gi.
Recall that by the definition of Hn−1:
Pr
[(
s0, v′−i
)]
=
qy︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr
[
v1 = ty|h
(
(v′2, . . .)
)
= y
]
· Pr
[
(v′2, . . . , v
′
i−1, s
0, v′i+1, . . . , v
′
n−1)
]
= qy · Pr
[
s0
]
· Πt∈{2,...,n−1}\{i} Pr
[
v′t
]
Where the last equality is by the fact that the values of bidders 2, . . . , n − 1 are (n− 2)-wise
independent. Additionally, for every j ∈ {d− y + 1, . . . , d− 1}:
Pr
[(
v′1, . . . , s
−j , . . . , v′n−1
)]
= Pr
[
v1 = ty|h
((
v′2, . . . , s
−j , . . . , v′n−1
))
> y
]
· Pr
[(
v′2, . . . , s
−j , . . . , v′n−1
)]
= qy · Pr
[
s−j
]
·Πt∈{2,...,n−1}\{i} Pr
[
v′t
]
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Thus:
Pr
[
v′
] (
ty − v
′
i
)
−
d−1∑
j=d−y+1
Pr
[(
s−j, v′−i
)]
· v′i
=Πt∈{2,...,n−1}\{i} Pr
[
v′t
]
·

qy ·
≥(1−ǫ) Pr[s−d]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr
[
s0
]
·

ty −
<1︷︸︸︷
v′i

− d−1∑
j=d−y+1
<1−ǫ︷︸︸︷
v′i · qy ·
≤Pr[s−d]︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr
[
s−j
]

 (1)
>Πt∈{2,...,n−1}\{i} Pr
[
v′t
]
· (1− ǫ) · Pr
[
s−d
]qy · (ty − 1)− d−y−1∑
j=1
qy

 (2)
=Πt∈{2,...,n−1}\{i} Pr
[
v′t
]
· (1− ǫ)
[
s−d
] z︷ ︸︸ ︷qy · ty −

 z︷ ︸︸ ︷qy + (d− y − 1) qy




=0 (3)
(1) is by Definition 3.2, as Pr
[
s0
]
≥ (1− ǫ) Pr
[
s−d
]
and Pr
[
s−j
]
≤ Pr
[
s−d
]
because the value of
bidder i is distributed 1−2ǫ+ǫ·ΣXij=1
1
2j
and Xi is d-balanced. (2) is by the fact that 1 > (1− ǫ) > vi.
(3) is by Lemma 3.3, specifically qy+(d− y − 1) qy = z. This shows that the revenue of M
′ is higher
than that of Mn−1.
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Existence of Balanced Distributions
Proposition A.1. For every d ≥ 1,0 < ǫ < 1 there exists an (ǫ, d)-balanced distribution.
Let Xdǫ be the following random variable (for 0 < ǫ < 1 and k ≥ 1): Pr
[
Xdǫ = k
]
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
⌈kd⌉−1
d
.
Notice that for d = 1 this is a regular Geometric distribution with p = ǫ. We show that Xdǫ is an
(ǫ, d) balanced distribution (as defined in Definition 3.2):
1. Clearly, the positive integers are the support.
2. Xdǫ is well defined. For every positive integer k, 0 < Pr [k] < 1, and
∑∞
j=1
ǫ(1−ǫ)⌈
j
d⌉−1
d
= 1.
3. For i = c · d+ 1 (where c ∈ (N ∪ {0}), i.e. i mod d = 1):
(a) For j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} Pr
[
Xdǫ = i+ j
]
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
⌈ c·d+1+jd ⌉−1
d
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
c−1+⌈ 1+jd ⌉
d
1+j≤d
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
c
d
.
(b) Pr
[
Xdǫ = i
]
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
c
d
and Pr
[
Xdǫ = i+ d
]
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
c+1
d
= ǫ(1−ǫ)
c
d
(1− ǫ) = Pr
[
Xdǫ = i
]
(1− ǫ).
A.2 The Limit of
∑d
j=d−⌊ dz⌋+1
1
j
Lemma A.2. limd→∞ z + (z − 1) (1− 2ǫ)
∑d
j=d−⌊ dz ⌋+1
1
j
= z + (z − 1) (1− 2ǫ)
Recall that for general a and b:
ln
(
a+ 1
b
)
=
∫ a+1
b
1
j
dj ≤
a∑
b
1
j
≤
∫ a
j=b+1
= ln
(
a
b+ 1
)
In our case: a = d and b = d−
⌊
d
z
⌋
+ 1. On one hand, as
(
a+1
b
)
= d+1
d−⌊ dz ⌋+1
:
lim
d+ 1
d−
⌊
d
z
⌋ = lim d+ 1
d− d
z
+ 1
= lim
zd+ z
(z − 1) d+ z
=
z
z − 1
On the other hand, as a
b+1 =
d+1
d−⌊ dz⌋+2
:
lim
d+ 1
d−
⌊
d
z
⌋
+ 2
= lim
zd+ z
d (z − 1) + 2z
=
z
z − 1
Therefore, by the Squeeze Theorem:
lim
d→∞
z + (z − 1) (1− 2ǫ)
d∑
j=d−⌊ dz⌋+1
1
j
= z + (z − 1) (1− 2ǫ) log
(
z
z − 1
)
= z + (z − 1) (1− 2ǫ)
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where the last equality follows as log
(
z
z−1
)
= log
( e
e−1
e
e−1
−1
)
= 1.
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